INTRODUCTION
On Thursday morning of 30 September, 1999, at around 10:35 A.M. a criticality accident occurred at JCO Co. Ltd. in Tokai-mura, Ibaraki Prefecture, Japan, and the criticality continued until the next morning for about 20 hours. Around 200 persons were exposed at the JCO site. Three persons who worked in the conversion building received very high doses. Their doses were estimated by lymphocyte counts, chromosome aberration, and Na-24 activity in their blood 1) .
The doses of all other JCO employees and emergency personnel were estimated by either personal dosimeters, whole-body counter measurements or behavior surveys. The highest dose, excluding the heavily exposed three workers, was estimated to be 48mSv 2) .
In addition to the exposure to JCO workers, this accident affected the residents outside the premise of JCO. It required the authorities to take responsible action concerning the residents, including health consultation and dose estimation. Na-24 activity in the body was measured only for seven of them by a whole-body counter. Their dose estimation, therefore, must be carried out based on a behavior survey, since they did not wear any dosimeters.
BEHAVIOR SURVEY
The Science and Technology Agency requested the National Institute of Radiological Sciences at the end of October, 1999, to carry out a behavior survey for dose estimations of the inhabitants around the JCO facility. The Health Management Committee of the Nuclear Safety Commission decided that the area for the behavior survey should be limited to the evacuated zone of 350 m around the JCO facility. The targeted people were the inhabitants in the evacuated zone and workers whose factories were located in the area. The behavior survey items focused on terms directly related dose assessment rather than health or mental condition. The date of the survey was informed to the residents before conducting it through the local government. The survey was carried out on 19 and 20 November, 1999, by ten survey groups. Each group consisted of two researchers from NIRS and one health nurse from Ibaraki Prefecture, who visited each individual house and factory to interview the residents to clarify their location during each thirty minutes, starting from 10:35 A.M. on 30 September to 6:15 A.M. on 1 October. The following data were obtained by the interview: the distance from the precipitation tank in the JCO facility where the criticality accident occurred, the type of the house, the position in the house, the wall materials and thickness, the roof materials, the angle of the house to JCO, and the body angle to JCO during the period of the initial 25 minutes i.e., from 10:35 until 11:00 on 30 September (is called BURST period 3) ). The interviewers also provided the residents general information about radiation and its risks so as to sooth their fear concerning radiation exposure. The total number of people interviewed was 265 from the residents of 48 families and the workers who were in 18 factories in the region on 30 September.
DOSE ESTIMATION
The outdoor effective dose equivalent was estimated based on three sets of monitoring data. One was the neutron and gamma dose rate monitoring data obtained from a survey performed around 20:45 on 30 September by (about 10 hours after the initiation of the accident, i.e., in the plateau period 3) ) a JAERI monitoring team with Anderson-Braun Rem Counters and ionization chambers. The spatial distribution of the ambient dose equivalent was evaluated by Stevenson's formula, 4) obtained from curve fitting to dose-rate measurements at 19 locations. The other was data obtained by the area monitors in the site of JCO, located about 140 m away from the precipitation tank. The data was utilized to define the time dependence of dose rates from 11 A.M. on 30 September till 6:15 A.M. 1 October. i.e., the plateau period. The third data was derived from a neutron monitor at the Naka Branch of JAERI, located 1.7 km away from the accident site. This data was used to estimate the ratio of the dose during the BURST period and the later 19.25 hours (plateau period). The first data set obtained from 105 m to 740 m from the precipitation tank showed no significant directional dependence on the dose rates 5, 6, 7) . Therefore, an isotropic dose distribution was assumed in the following dose estimation. All three data sets mentioned above were results measured as ambient dose equivalent; H* (10) . In order to convert the ambient dose equivalent to the effective dose equivalent, the energy spectrum of neutrons and gamma rays with distance from the JCO facility were estimated by a one-dimensional radiation transport code, ANISN-JR 8) . The conversion factor for neutrons varies from 0.55 to 0.45, depending on the distance from the tank. The conversion factor for gamma rays was around 0.9 3) . Under the present Japanese law, a new concept of ICRP60 9) had not been adopted. Therefore, the effective dose was not used for the dose estimation. The effective dose equivalents in the environment were derived at every 10 meters from the tank and for every 30 minutes, starting from 11 A.M. on 30 September until 6:15 A.M. 1 October. Table 1 demonstrates some cumulative effective dose equivalents from neutrons and gamma rays for selected distances up to the defined time from the beginning of the accident for a person standing outside facing the precipitation tank at that distance for the entire time. Neutrons were the dominant dose contributor in this accident. The percentage of neutron dose to the total dose decreased slightly, depending on the distance from 84% at 70 m to 80% at 1000 m. The effective dose equivalents in Table 1 show the highest dose to a person at each distance, since the irradiation geometry was assumed to be Anterior-Posterior AP 10) . Individual persons might be exposed with different geometry, or behind shielding materials, or moving from one place to another; in these cases, the dose to the person would not be obtained directly from the table, and individual doses would be lower than the values given in Table 1 . The individual doses could be obtained after clarifying the location and shielding condition of individual persons during the accident until evacuation or termination of the criticality.
DETERMINATION OF THE DISTANCE AND OUTDOOR DOSE EVERY 30 MINUTES
The precise distance from the precipitation tank to the place where the resident stayed was evaluated using a city planning map of a reduced scale of 1/2500, which was used in the Tokaimura office 11) . Each house and factory was drawn on the map, and could be identified by the name of the owners. Concentric circles were drawn every 20 m radius on the map to identify the distance of each house as well as the location inside the house in 10 m unit. In the case that the person moved during the 30 minutes, the nearest distance was chosen in order not to underestimate the received dose, unless he moved a much longer distance of more than 20 m.
The dose every 30 minutes without any shielding effect was obtained using the distance estimated from the map mentioned above and the dose values given in Table 1 . The dose contribution during the time when the person was outside the 1000 m zone from the precipitation tank was neglected, since the cumulative dose at the boundary of the 1000 m zone during the continuation of criticality for about 20 hours was estimated to be 0.007 mSv. Table 1 gives the dose for these people who stayed outdoors. The shielding effect should be considered, since some of the residents were inside their house. Shielding data for houses was not available from the literature, especially for neutrons. A dose reconstruction in Hiroshima and Nagasaki was performed while considering an old-type Japanese house, which is rarely seen these days 12) . The recent house structure has a wider variety, and is different from the Japanese house model used for calculations involving the Atomic Bomb Detonation. In addition, the energy spectrum of neutrons and gamma rays entering into the houses were also different from that observed in Hiroshima. Therefore, a new calculation for the present accident was carried out. The leakage neutron and gamma-ray spectra from the precipitation tank were calculated with a one-dimensional discrete ordinate code, ANISN 13) . Using the source spectra mentioned above, a radiation transport calculation was carried out with a geometry consisting of the conversion building, soil and atmospheric air using a two-dimensional discrete ordinate code, DOT3.5 14) , to obtain the incident energy spectra of neutrons and gamma rays to the houses in the evacuated area. The transmission factors for the neutron and gamma-ray energy spectrum for the building materials were calculated with ANISN by taking into account their composition and thickness, which were defined based on consultations with an architect (see Table 2 ). All of the calculations were performed with an assumption of normal incidence of neutrons and gamma rays to the wall, even though the wall might not actually face the precipitation tank with vertical position, and scattered neutrons and gamma rays (which contributed around 80% of the total dose 6 ) might not enter the wall perpendicularly. In addition, any shielding effect of the surrounding houses was neglected, while taking into account the large percentage of scattered neutrons and gamma rays, which reached the house not directly, but after scattering in the air. These assumptions resulted into an overestimation, rather than an underestimation. 
HOUSE SHIELDING CALCULATION

CLASSIFICATION OF HOUSES AND DOSE INSIDE A HOUSE
The houses and factories in the evacuated zone were investigated with the consultation of an architect to categorize the structure for evaluating the shielding effect due to the wall materials. The shielding conditions were classified into 11 categories (see Table 2 ) while taking into account various combinations of the wall materials of the houses, which included sole glass window shielding, since some residents declared that they had stayed just beside a glass window. The least shielding effect was due to a glass window of 6% for neutrons and 7% for gamma rays. The heaviest shielding effect was found for a concrete wall of 150 mm thickness of concrete with a 12 mm gypsum board. The reductions of the neutron and gamma ray dose contributions were 87% and 83% for neutrons and gamma rays, respectively. Table 3 gives examples of the range of the shielding effect inside model houses with two stories and several rooms. The dose would be higher for a person who stayed in a room that was the closest place in the house to the precipitation tank. The person would have the shielding of only one front wall. While, a person who stayed inside at the far end of the house from the precipitation tank would have larger shielding due to the additional walls and ceiling. However, in the present calculation, only the front wall defined for each house category was considered as the shielding materials, since memory concerning the position inside the house in most cases was not sufficiently clear to carry out a precise calculation. This assumption also provides an overestimation of the individual dose.
DOSE ESTIMATION DURING MOVING
When the person was found to be moving during the accident, including the evacuation, the basic information concerning time, route and means of transportation was obtained during the interview. Based on the information obtained by the behavior survey, the total dose during the moving was estimated by integrating the dose rate along the route. The following simplified dose-estimation method was adopted. A prefectural road, Urizura line, runs as a straight line at the left-side boundary of the JCO facility with the nearest point 70 m from the tank. A national road, Route No.6, runs in a straight line south of JCO with the nearest point being 230 m from the tank. All persons were assumed to be moving at the same speed of 10, 4 and 1 m/s by car, bicycle, on foot, respectively. The total dose was obtained by integrating Stevenson's formula, obtained from the curve fitting, for a person who had moved from the far end of the road to the other end through the nearest point to the tank. Then, the duration of time at the closest point on the road to the precipitation tank was evaluated so as to be equivalent to the total dose, since the distance dependence of the dose rate was assumed to be constant during continuation of the criticality. In addition, the dose during the waiting time for a traffic light at a crossing, Nikenjaya Crossing, was evaluated as additional exposure only for car transportation.
RESULTS OF DOSE RECONSTRUCTION
The doses due to neutrons and gamma rays were calculated based on Table 1 and the shielding results for every 30 minutes in which the distance from the precipitation tank, the shielding effect and occupancy factor were identified. The dose during each 30-minute segment was then summed up until the evacuation or the end of the criticality to obtain the total individual dose. The dose during transportation to Funaishikawa Community Center, which was used as an evacuation center, was estimated while taking into account the route from the house to the center. The dose in the Community Center was neglected, since it is located at 1.2 km away from the tank. The present dose reconstruction by the behavior survey was targeted to the inhabitants in the evacuated area in Tokai-mura and Naka-machi in addition to those individuals who worked on the day of 30 September at private companies in the evacuated area. For these inhabitants, all persons were listed in the behavior survey as a candidate for future health care by the authorities regardless of their presence during the accident in the evacuated zone. However, the dose to those who were outside the 1 km zone from the tank was estimated to be zero. The number of people in each category is given in Table 4 . The total number of persons listed is 264, of which 206 were given a dose estimation, since the rest, i.e., 58 persons, were found to be not present within the 1 km radius zone from the tank during the 20 hours. The dose reconstruction for those individuals was carried out in the way mentioned above. Dose reconstruction was performed on the basis to obtain the most appropriate and reasonable dose to each individual. However, the residents could not recall all details of movement during the accident, since the behavior survey was conducted 50 days after the accident. Therefore, where there was a large uncertainty, such as positioning in the house, body angle to the precipitation tank or movement, assumptions leading to the highest dose were adopted. This could lead to no underestimation due to the uncertainty of the movement during the accident.
The doses of seven persons out of 206 were also evaluated using a whole-body counter, which were defined to be the official record of dose. Therefore, the records of 7 persons are not included in Table 5 . The effective dose equivalents of 179 persons out of 199 were less than 5 mSv. Especially, all residents in Naka-machi received less than 1 mSv, reflecting the distance of Naka-machi from the precipitation tank. The highest dose was found to be 21 mSv in Tokai villagers.
The results of the dose estimation as well as the dose reconstruction procedure were reviewed and examined by an expert committee organized by the Science and Technology Agency 2) .
SECOND VISIT TO INFORM THE RESULT
After announcing a revisit schedule to the inhabitants as well as to the press, ten teams visited the houses and factories in Tokai-mura and Naka-machi on 28 and 29 January, 2000. The teams stayed in each house for one to two hours to explain the individual dose, the dose estimation method and the radiation risk. Special care has been taken on privacy so as not to release any estimated individual dose to others.
